About the author
Brigadier J.P.Dalvi was
born in Basra (Iraq)on 3rd July 1920 where his father was
serving with the British Administration. In 1929, he came to India
and completed his school and college education in Bombay. At the outbreak of
the 2nd World War, he quit his education and decided to join
the Army. In January 1962 he volunteered to command 7 Infantry Brigade in
the North-east Frontier Agency Sector of Towang. He was captured by
the Chinese Forces on 22nd October and repatriated in May 1963.
It was in their custody that he formed the general outline of the book that
would tell the real story of the biggest blunder in Indian military history.
Synopsis
It is not just another book on the corner, it is rather a
memoir. A memoir starting in the decade preceding the India-China was in the
year 1962. Dalvi starts with building
the premise way before the actual occurrence of the war as the real reasons lay
in the historical buildup to the war. Firstly, he discusses the Indian role in
the Tibet region and how those historical dealings between the governments of
British India and Tibet would lead to disastrous repercussions in the coming
decades. Secondly, Dalvi talks in detail about the fibers of Indian Foreign
Policy in the Nehruvian era and how it
had a deep impact on the equations of the possible war. Then he describes the
half-hearted preparations for the war by the Indian side. Further he describes
the war scene in grave detail and how Chinese perceived the Indian side.
Part wise analysis
Part1: The years
of credulity and negligence
This being the genesis of the political plot of the war
he goes to the historic origins of the story and details the role of British
India in the dealings with Tibet which did not go very well with China. He supports his analysis by the words of India’s
distinguished President, Dr. S. Radhakrishnan when he exclaimed, “We have been
negligent and credulous”. He talks about the uneasy lull during the first half of
the decade of 1950s and how casually Indian Government took the Chinese
incursions in those times. He talks about the half-hearted preparations of the army
and the fact that in terms of capacity and military might we had already lost
the war to China.
Part2:The fateful
year 1962
Here he talks of the wishful
thinking of the political bosses and the armchair assumption that the Chinese
would never attack. Nehru was of the firm belief that the Chinese would totally respect the
principles of Panchsheel. Here he describes the disastrous “Forward Policy” or
the Operation Onkar which gave the Chinese a reason to attack.
Part3: On to the
Namka Chu
Here he neatly describes the
pre-war setting and the burgeoning of both forces on either side of the river. The
description here is so lively that you actually feel while reading that you are
in fact roaming in the battle field and witnessing the preparations for real. Here
the author critically discusses the Operation or intention of Indian government
to “evict the Chinese from the Indian territories.
Part4: The end of
make believe
Here the author describes the
homecoming of our political brass who where on international diplomatic mission
at the time of the Chinese incursions. He takes a critical dig at the decisions
and pre-occupations of our Prime Minister in those fateful times. He
emotionally describes the war-setting chosen by the Indian forces was extremely
vulnerable and put the Chinese at a vantage point. He describes the clash at
Tseng Jong and the subsequent policy fluctuations on the Indian side.
Part 5: The battle
at Namka Chu River
This part starts with the
amended mandate for the forces. Witnessing the Chinese might in the clash at Tseng
John, the Indian leadership decides that it would be best to defend the
positions rather than mounting an attack on the proven-superior Chinese forces.
Here is critically analyzes both the stances and is able to prove to the reader
that both where utterly wrong decisions and the right course would have been
something else. Moreover, he criticizes the absence of higher leadership at the
most crucial time in the war. And lastly he describes the humiliating times
when he was a captive of the Chinese Army.
Part6: The reason
why
Moving out from the
battlefield, he launches a ruthless and deserving attack on the political
leadership of that times. He asserts that the “civil supremacy” cannot be
allowed to interfere in matters which are purely strategic and military in
nature. Then he compares and contrasts the roles of various Defence Ministers
of India in those fateful years.
Critical
Evaluation
Dalvi’s writing is immensely
descriptive which makes it more of a memoir than a story.
His style of presenting
pre-analysis and post-analysis helps the reader tremendously to understand the
nitty-gritty's of war with ease. Moreover, the various references made by him
and the illustrations taken from various works to make the reader understand
his own references shows the kind of detailed work that he has undertaken in
the making of this wonderful masterpiece. One of the shortcomings though
has been the fact that it is conspicuous that the author is not a regular
writer and in the process he gives away the gist of the whole event in the
early ramblings itself. Also he seem to reassert the same assertions again and
again which becomes like tiny road-blocks for the reader. And finally, this
brave attempt to tell the truth to the world must be commended eternally.
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